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Abstract 
 
 In this Comment we question the security of recently proposed by Degiovanni et al. 
[Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 032310] scheme of quantum dense key distribution.  
 
PACS number(s): 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Recently Degiovanni et al. [1] have proposed (and experimentally implemented) a new 
protocol of quantum key distribution. As it embeds the advantages of both quantum key 
distribution scheme and quantum dense coding scheme, the new protocol has been called 
quantum dense key distribution (QDKD). The novelty of QDKD lies in the fact that it enables 
legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to exchange two bits – one generated by Alice ( j ) and 
second generated by Bob ( k ) during a single round of the protocol, i.e. with the use of a 
single qubit traveling from Alice to Bob and backward. In this way the efficiency (if properly 
defined) of the protocol could surpass that of e.g. BB84 protocol [2]. The authors analyze the 
effect of the quantum channel losses and conclude that QDKD is more efficient than BB84 for 
the quantum transmission probability %71≥P . QDKD has been claimed to be secure against 
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all individual attacks. The security condition proposed has the form of an inequality (Eq. (6) 
of [1]) involving two parameters – quantum bit error rate Q  and probability of correlated 
results corrP . The security proof states that fulfillment of this inequality ensures that mutual 
information between an eavesdropper (Eve) and legitimate users is less than that between 
Alice and Bob. In this Comment we question this statement. We present two simple schemes 
which enables Eve to acquire mutual information exceeding that of Alice and Bob while still 
fulfilling the above mentioned inequality. 
This Comment is organized in the following way. In order to present notation we 
summarize the QDKD in Sec. II. In Sec. III we present simple counterexample to Eq. (4) of 
[1]. Secs. IV and V contain our main result i.e. the eavesdropping protocols which show that 
the security condition given by Eq. (6) of [1] is not sufficient to ensure security of the QDKD 
protocol. We present an attack on the Alice and Bob key in Sec. IV and V respectively.  
 
 
II. QUANTUM DENSE KEY DISTRIBUTION 
 
 In this section we summarize the QDKD protocol originally proposed in [1]. Each 
round of this protocol consists of the following steps:  
1. Alice prepares two qubits in modes A and B in a singlet state −ΨAB , where 
( ) 20110 BABAAB ±=Ψ± . (In the experimental implementation of Degiovanni et al. [1] 
K0 ( K1 ) stands for a horizontally (vertically) polarized single photon in a given spatial 
mode K ). 
2. Alice encodes the value of her key j  by performing operation jBZ  where 
BBBBBZ 1100 −=  and sends the qubit B to Bob.  
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3. Bob randomly switches between two modes, namely the message mode (MM) and the 
control mode (CM). 
4MM. In MM Bob encodes the value of his key k  by performing operation  kBZ   and sends the 
qubit B back to Alice. 
5MM. Alice performs measurement which discriminates between the orthogonal states ±ΨAB  
and announces publicly its result m  ( 0=m  stands for −ΨAB , whereas 1=m stands for 
+ΨAB ). 
6MM. Alice and Bob calculate the value of their partner’s key according to 
jmk A ⊕=)(
 
        (1) 
kmj B ⊕=)( , 
where )( Ak  is the value of Bob’s key as seen by Alice and )(Bj  is the value of Alice’s key 
seen by Bob. 
4CM. In CM Alice and Bob perform local measurements (projectors on the base { }10 , ) 
which, together with the use of classical communication, allows an estimation of the mean 
value of the parity operator  ABABABABR 11110000 += . 
  After many rounds of the protocol Alice and Bob estimate quantum bit error rates 
   ( ))()( BA jjprobQ ≠=  
      (2) ( ))()( AB kkprobQ ≠=  
and the probability of correlated results RPcorr = . Of course in the case of noiseless channel 
and without eavesdropping 0=corrP  and kjm ⊕= . It follows that ( ) jj B = , ( ) kk A =  and 
( ) ( ) 0== BA QQ . On the other hand, if the values of  ( )AQ  , ( )BQ  or corrP  are nonzero then 
Alice and Bob use these parameters to estimate maximal information available to Eve. The 
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main result of the security proof given in Section III of [1] states that the following inequality 
(given with the use of  Shannon binary entropy )(xH ) 
   1)()( <+ corrPHQH ,       (3) 
ensures that mutual information between legitimate users is greater then between any of them 
and the eavesdropper i.e.   
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XYI  stands for mutual information on key Z between users X  and Y . 
 
 
III. SIMPLE SCHEME WITH NO CORRELATION INDUCED 
 
With the general strategy of eavesdropping given by operators BEJ  and BEK  acting on 
mode B  and some auxiliary system E  in state Ee  (see Fig. 1 of [1]) the probability of 
correlated results is given by ( )RTrPcorr ρ= , where ( ) +⊗= BEEEABBE JeeJ ρρ , with 
( ) 2−−++ ΨΨ+ΨΨ=ρ ABABABABAB . (Here and below we assume that both keys are symmetric 
i.e. 0  and 1 is generated with the same probability.) Degiovanni et al. present the following 
formula (Eq. 4 in [1]) for the probability of correlated results 
( )−+ νµ+= ABEABEcorrP 121 ,      (5) 
where  
   
EABBEBBEABE
EABBEBBEABE
eJZK
eJZK
⊗Ψ=ν
⊗Ψ=µ
−−
++
1
0
 .    (6) 
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Below we will show that Eq. (5) is not generally valid. Let us take as an auxiliary system E  
single mode and let this mode not contain any photons. Such a state will be denoted by 
EE vace = . Let both operators BEJ  and BEK  be the SWAP operators  
   BEBEBE SWAPKJ ==  .      (7) 
Obviously with such an “eavesdropping” scheme Bob detects no photons and consequently 
0=corrP . On the other hand,  
   
EABABE
EABABE
e
e
⊗Ψ=ν
⊗Ψ=µ
−−
++
       (8) 
and from Eq. (5) one obtains 021 ≠= /Pcorr . Of course, our scheme is not an eavesdropping 
one as it does not provide any information to Eve. In the next section we show, however, that 
it can be easily modified to be an effective eavesdropping tool. 
 
IV. ATTACK ON ALICE’S KEY 
 
The proposed eavesdropping strategy consists of two modes – the eavesdropping 
mode and error tuning mode. Each photon traveling form Alice to Bob and backward is 
attacked by one of these two modes at random. The eavesdropping mode is taken with a 
probability p ( 10 <≤ p ) and the error tuning mode with a probability ( )p−1 .  
Error tuning mode. In this mode (see Fig. 1a) Eve does not obtain any information 
about the key. However, it enables her to control quantum bit error rates ( )AQ  and ( )BQ  and 
thus to control mutual information between Alice and Bob. There is no need for any auxiliary 
system in this mode. The unitary operator BBE IJ =  is just identity on mode B , whereas BEK   
is given by qBBE ZK = . q  takes the value of zero with a probability 





ε+
2
1
and the value of 
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one with a probability 






ε−
2
1
. Parameter ε  is bounded by 210 /≤ε< . Obviously the 
probability of the correlated results vanishes i.e. 0=corrP . The value of the Alice’s final 
measurement in this mode is given by qkjm ⊕⊕= . It follows form Eq. (1) that 
qkk )A( ⊕=  and qjj )B( ⊕= . Thus quantum bit error rates are  
   
ε−==
2
1)B()A( QQ
 .       (9) 
Eavesdropping mode. In this mode an auxiliary system E is needed (see Fig. 1b). Let it be 
again be a single, empty mode ( EE vace = ). The  unitaries are defined as 
BE
q
BBE
BEBE
SWAPZK
SWAPJ
=
=
.       (10) 
Now q  takes both values (zero and one) with the same probability 21 . The probability of the 
correlated results vanishes again ( 0=corrP ). The value of the Alice’s final measurement does 
not depend on k  and is given by qjm ⊕= . Thus qk )A( = , kqjj )B( ⊕⊕=  and the 
quantum bit error rates are   
   
2
1
==
)B()A( QQ
 ,       (11) 
which means that there is no information flow between Alice and Bob in this mode. On the 
other hand Eve can correctly calculate the value of Alice’s key with the use of the equation 
qmj )E( ⊕= . Thus, Eve has a perfect knowledge of Alice’s key during the eavesdropping 
mode and knows nothing about Alice’s key during the error tuning mode. It follows that 
mutual information between Eve and Alice is given by 
   pI )A(AE = .        (12) 
From  Eqs. (9) and (11) the total quantum bit error rates can be calculated as 
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xQQ )B()A( −==
2
1
,       (13) 
where ( )px −ε= 1 . It leads to the following formula for mutual information between Alice 
and Bob ( ) ( )






−−== xHII BAB
A
AB 2
11 . With the assumed bounds on p  and ε  ( 10 <≤ p  and 
210 /≤ε< ) parameter x  can take arbitrary value within the range 210 ≤< x .  This ensures   
that mutual information ( )AABI  is nonzero i.e. 
( ) 0>AABI .        (14) 
For a given p  Eve can choose the parameter ε  to allow any value of ( )AABI  within the range  
( ) ( )210 /pHI AAB −<< . Let us now analyze the security condition given in [1]. Clearly 
( ) ( ) ( )AABcorr IPHQH −=+ 1 , which due to Eq. (14) always fulfills the required inequality 
( ) ( ) 1<+ corrPHQH . 
 It should be noticed that our eavesdropping scheme induces losses which can be 
observed by Bob during the control mode. Let us denote by P the probability that a photon is 
successfully transmitted from Alice to Bob in the case of no eavesdropping. The transmission  
probability as observed by Bob - obsP   is suppressed due to Eve’s action and takes the value 
( )pobs −= 1PP . Thus, the parameter obsP  could be used as an eavesdropping witness. Let us 
emphasize, however, that the security proof based on transmission probability cannot be 
based on fundamental principles, which is usually expected in the field of quantum 
cryptography. This is because one cannot be sure that Eve does not replace the original 
quantum channel by a better one with the transmission probability P'  ( PP' > ). In this way 
Eve can hide induced losses provided that she chooses the value of MAXpp < , where  
( ) P'PP /'−=MAXp . Thus  eavesdropping can be safely performed in the realistic case 1<P . 
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V. ATTACK ON BOB’S KEY 
 
This attack also consists of error tuning mode and eavesdropping mode (taken with 
probability )1( p−  and p respectively. The error tuning mode is the same as the one presented 
in Sec. IV. In the eavesdropping mode (see Fig. 1c) Eve uses an auxiliary system E , which is 
a single mode again, however, now it contains a single horizontally polarized photon i.e. 
EEe 0= .  Eve starts with measuring the qubit in the mode B in the base { }10 , . Let us 
denote the result of this measurement by t . Note that after the measurement mode B contains 
no photons. Next two operations, first BEV  and then tBX , are performed on state 
EBBE vac 0
)0(
=Ψ  . Unitary operation BEV  can be easily implemented with the use of a half-
wave plate and a polarizing beam splitter (see Fig. 2).  BEV  performs the following 
transformation, when acting on relevant states, ( 1,0=s ) 
 ( )( )EBsEBEBBE vacvacisvacV 1102 −+−= .   (15) 
The operation X  is just the polarization NOT gate ( 0110 +=X ). It is performed 
conditionally when the measured photon appears vertically polarized ( 1=t ). Thus, after 
performing operation VX tB  the state of the modes B and E  is  
   
( )EBEBBEtBBE vacvactiVX 12)0()1( +
−
=Ψ=Ψ
 .   (16) 
The above equation explains why the probability of correlated results again vanishes 
( 0=corrP ).  During the control mode measurement Bob has equal chances of finding no 
photon in mode B or finding a photon in the appropriate polarization state t . In the message 
mode the state )1(BEΨ  is transformed by Bob into  
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( )( )EBEBtkBEkBBE vacvactiZ 112)1()2( +−−=Ψ=Ψ  . (17) 
Eve transforms the above state with the use of  ( )+VX tB  operation into )3(BEΨ . It follows from 
Eq. (15) that 
   
( ) ( )EBtkBE tkvac1)3( −=Ψ .      (18) 
Thus the result of the measurement performed by Eve on mode E  is given by tkn = . Finally 
Eve sends a photon in the state Bt  back to Alice. Alice state is now given by  
( ) ( )( )−+ Ψ−−Ψ=− ABtABBA tt 1211 .    (19) 
 So Alice’s measurement generates results m  randomly, independently of j  and k . Quantum 
bit error rates during eavesdropping mode are thus equal to 2/1 . It means that analysis of the 
mutual information between Alice and Bob presented in the previous Section applies to the 
present case as well. Let us now consider the mutual information between Eve and Bob. In the 
case of 0=t  the result of Eve measurement 0=n  (which is obviously independent of k ). 
However, in the case of 1=t  the result of this measurement kn =  gives her perfect 
knowledge about the key. Both cases are equally probably so the considered mutual 
information is given by 
   
( )
2
pI BBE = .        (20) 
Let us recall here that for a given p  Eve can arbitrarily tune ( )BABI  within the range  
( ) ( )2/10 pHI BAB −<< . Once again Eve gets the advantage ( ) ( )BABBBE II > , while fulfilling the 
security condition ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 <−=+ BABcorr IPHQH .  
 Let us also consider the losses induced by an attack on Bob’s key. The observed 
transmission probability is given by ( ) 2/1 ppobs +−= PP . Thus PP ≥obs  if 21≤P . In this 
case there is not only no need for quantum channel improvement but even an appropriate 
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fraction of photons has to be filtered off. In the opposite case 21>P  Eve can hide induced 
losses if she uses a quantum channel of transmission probability PP' > and takes MAXpp < , 
where  ( ) ( )21/' −−= P'PPMAXp . 
 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
 
 We have presented two eavesdropping schemes which impair the security of the 
recently proposed QDKD protocol. Let us emphasize that none of them requires the so-called 
unlimited computing power. In contrary, both schemes can be easily implemented with the use 
of current technology. If Eve can perform polarization CNOT gate (which is still beyond 
today’s technology) she can use the scheme previously proposed by us [3] in the context of 
ping-pong protocol [4] to improve her attack on Bob’s key.  With this scheme, the quantum 
bit error rate generated by eavesdropping can be reduced from 2/1  to 4/1 . Let us finally 
emphasize that we do not criticize the general idea of combining quantum key distribution 
with quantum dense coding. Note that this idea has been recently successfully exploited by 
Cai and Li [5] in their quantum cryptographic protocol. What we wish to show in this 
Comment is that the condition given in Eq. (6) of [1] does not ensure secure transmission of 
the keys. 
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Fig. 1 Eavesdropping schemes: (a) error tuning mode, (b) eavesdropping mode (attack on 
Alice key), (c) eavesdropping mode (attack on Bob key).  
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Fig.2 Optical implementation of unitary operation BEV . HWP – half-wave plate, PBS – 
polarizing beam splitter. 
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